

**Consolidation of the GC Policy Dialogue on
The Role of the Private Sector in Zones of Conflict
Expert Workshop #1**

“Identifying Public Policy Options to Promote Conflict-Sensitive Business Practices”

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Meeting Report

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Meeting Objectives:

The central objective of this workshop was to enlist key participants of the Global Compact’s three-year *Dialogue on the Role of the Private Sector in Zones of Conflict* to assist the United Nations, its agencies, and member states in designing practical policies to promote the integration of conflict-sensitive business practices into broader strategies of conflict prevention, conflict management and sustainable post conflict recovery. Specific aims included:

- To identify and discuss key areas where public policy responses are needed in order to harness the positive potential of business in zones of conflict, as well as mitigate against negative business impacts throughout the conflict cycle;
- To develop policy recommendations regarding how the UN system, Governments and IFIs can further engage the private sector in conflict prevention and peace building, particularly through private-public partnerships, other multistakeholder initiatives, and policy initiatives;
- To identify gaps in existing practical initiatives aimed at conflict-sensitive business practices and propose ways to scale-up or better implement them;
- To explore ideas involving the creation of new initiatives to address emerging challenges;

These discussions as well as those of a follow-up expert workshop will form the basis of a policy-relevant report with recommendations for governments (both of the North and the South), the UN and its agencies, and International Financial Institutions. The relevant policy findings are also intended to feed into a parallel but separate initiative undertaken by the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on the Political Economy of Armed Conflict, established by the Senior Management Group, to promote improved policy responses by the UN to the economic dimensions of armed conflict.

In identifying avenues for improved public policies for conflict-sensitive business practices, this effort seeks to complement and strengthen the on-going efforts of relevant Global Compact stakeholders, including companies.

A secondary objective was to identify modalities by which the GC Private Sector Dialogue and its stakeholders may facilitate the development of a practical implementation project in a region with a high risk of conflict.

Rationale: The Need for Public Policy Engagement

Since its inception in 2001, the Global Compact (GC) has served as the primary vehicle by which the UN system has sought to engage the capacities and energies of the private sector to assist in the implementation of 9, now 10, core universal principles, long recognized by governments as critical to the promotion and protection of peace, security, human rights, good governance, environmental protection and sustainable development.

The cornerstones of this initiative have been multistakeholder dialogue, learning and partnership among key actors, including companies, NGOs, labor organizations, policy experts and UN agencies and departments. This approach has been successful in promoting the core principles among a growing number of companies and regional networks that includes some 1,700 companies across 70 countries.

The first topic the GC embarked upon through the organization of multistakeholder dialogues was “The Role of the Private Sector in Zones of Conflicts.” Various international and regional-level meetings led to the creation of a network of like-minded actors from a range of sectors (companies, NGOs, labour, Governments, and the UN); produced recommendations on improving management practices (e.g. revenue-sharing regimes); resulted in the development of practical tools by which companies can undertake conflict-sensitive business practices (“Business Guide to Conflict Impact Assessment and Risk Management in Zones of Conflict”); and stimulated further research into the linkages between business and conflict.

Understood broadly, “conflict-sensitive business practices” refer both to proactive and responsive efforts to ensure that routine company investments and operations in zones of instability, violent conflict or post-conflict do not exacerbate conflict dynamics as well as to positive efforts to actively contribute to peacebuilding, human security, and sustainable development.

Such efforts include, inter alia: conflict-impact assessments that anticipate ways in which investments and operations may exacerbate instability, so as to devise appropriate remedies from the outset; community engagement with affected populations; responsible use of security services; and commitment to transparent and accountable business dealings with host governments and communities.

Given the newness of private-public engagement in peace and security, traditionally the exclusive preserve of governments and the UN Security Council, the GC policy dialogue on “The Role of the Private Sector in Zones of Conflict” has been an important forum for sensitizing business to both the negative and positive impacts of their investment decisions and operational management in vulnerable and war-torn countries. Participating companies have gained a clearer understanding of the strong links between risk management, corporate social responsibility, peace building and sustainability.

In so doing, the policy dialogue has reinforced ongoing parallel efforts at industry self-regulation through corporate codes of conduct and voluntary industry standards such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative.

Among the participants of the workshop, there was broad consensus that these accomplishments, while necessary, are as yet insufficient. As yet, the efforts of the policy dialogue have not yielded a cumulative, systemic impact nor have they developed to a stage of sustainability. While the policy dialogue has been active in global outreach, having held three regional dialogues (Central Asia, Africa, South America), its impact “on the ground” has been modest. In addition, there is a need to extend these efforts to a wider number of sectors and regional and local business communities.

While company and industry self-regulation have been invaluable in engaging private sector actors and in altering their corporate cultures, it has had little by way of cumulative positive impact on conflict dynamics. While there are a growing number of private companies that have revolutionized their policies to become models of conflict-sensitive business in war-torn countries, by far, most business actors continue to conduct their business as usual.

Identifying and Understanding the Policy Gap

Several reasons were offered to explain this policy gap:

First, by definition, voluntary initiatives appeal only to those business actors that value their reputation as socially responsible actors and share a concern for the wider non-business impacts of their investments and operations. This self-selection bias means that many other critical actors do not participate, including state-owned enterprises, and junior companies. This lack of coverage compounds the weaknesses of enforcement that characterize many voluntary initiatives.

Second, voluntary codes do not have clear criteria for participation or established performance obligations and are not self-enforcing. As such, they continue to suffer a broader “credibility gap”;

Third, there has been a proliferation of, often competing, codes of conduct, most of which do not yet explicitly deal with conflict, and few of which have global reach and authority. This lack of authoritative global guidance leaves companies uncertain as to what standards they should adopt and which expectations they should strive to meet.

Fourth, companies still lack practical, firm-level guidance on a variety of critical issues regarding effective implementation of conflict-sensitive business practices, including how to conduct their operations where host country law and governance is absent; how to identify legitimate community interlocutors; how to deal with armed groups; how to manage extended supply chains; how to ensure security while protecting civilians; and how to determine the criteria by which to assess those settings where conflict and absence of rule of law are so severe that investment and operations cannot be assured to “do no harm”, let alone to promote peacebuilding.

Given these gaps, it remains difficult to separate out good performers from bad performers. More worrisome, the efforts of good performers are undermined by unscrupulous and opportunistic rivals that care less for reputational concerns and for whom the pursuit of profit trumps responsible corporate behavior.

Company participants also expressed a concern regarding the continuing lack of clarity regarding the respective roles of business, home and host governments, the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations. Companies reiterated that they are not in a position to tell host governments what to do, nor do they want to be placed in a position where they are compelled to take on core government functions, such as the provision of security, welfare and other public goods to civilians in countries where governments lack the will or capacity to do so.

From this, a consensus emerged that, while there is much that business can contribute to the agenda of conflict management, ultimately, success will depend on engaging governments and intergovernmental fora, including the United Nations, who remain the main guarantors of rule of law, international peace and security, and global governance.

For these reasons, the central focus of workshop discussions was to identify gaps and opportunities for effective public policy interventions to complement the self-regulation voluntarily undertaken by business actors, individually, collectively and through a range of multistakeholder partnerships.

Tapping the Comparative Advantage of Governments and The United Nations

Governments

”Governments set public policies. Good governments set public policy perspectives”, was how one company expressed it. However, to date government action in support of conflict-sensitive business practices has been sporadic and incomplete, more talk than walk. As even company representatives conceded, prescription by governments is sometimes needed, particularly as voluntary initiatives, by definition, are self-selecting and do not appeal to those business actors with little regard for reputational standing or the social consequences of their actions.

Government policies can complement self-regulation by creating inducements, compliance obligations, market and /or legal sanction for non-compliance. Only law can create common and clear guidelines essential to ensure a level playing field for responsible companies. Only governments make law. Only governments working in concert, through the United Nations and other intergovernmental fora can create a level global playing field.

The United Nations

The United Nations system has much to bring to the development of public policies that support conflict-sensitive business practices. Its strengths include presence on the ground in conflict-affected countries, intimate knowledge of local society, politics, culture, economic needs, and conflict dynamics; good offices; reputation at local level; international authority; extensive peacekeeping skills, experience with SSR and DDR and with alternative livelihood development in fragile, post-conflict settings. This said, apart from UN Security Council Sanctions on conflict commodities and conflict financing, UN departments and agencies have only begun to explore how to utilize these capacities to promote private -public cooperation on conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery

International Financial Institutions and Government Lending Agencies

Most overseas investment projects rely on some form of public financing, whether through national export credit and overseas investment agencies or through project backing by International Financial Institutions, such as the World Bank’s banking of an international pipeline project in Chad-Cameroon. In conflict zones, public financing also takes the form of project risk insurance, which is often indispensable to private sector investment and operations in these settings.

This said, financial institutions have been latecomers to the CSR agenda, particularly to that part of the agenda that seeks to promote more robust mechanisms for promoting and rewarding those companies with a demonstrated record of conflict-sensitive business practices.

Many participants believed that there remains a great untapped potential to” leverage the leveragers”, so that all public lending policies to companies in conflict zones adhere to and promote the highest standards of human rights and security and fiscal probity by making fiscal transparency reports and continual conflict impact assessments a requirement for lending.

Survey of Current Initiatives/Standards that May Apply to The Promotion of Conflict-Sensitive Business Practices: (See Table 1)

Participants agreed that efforts to address the role of business and conflict, both positive and negative, are not adequately captured by the voluntary vs. mandatory dichotomy. Rather, these initiatives span a spectrum of regulation in which some of the most promising initiative to date have been hybrids.

As this schema suggests, efforts to promote conflict-sensitive business practices have thus far been approached from a range of starting points (anti-corruption, human rights, labor protection, environmental sustainability, etc.). Not all of these were initiated with conflict prevention or conflict management in mind. While some have a direct bearing on the nexus between business and conflict, such as the Voluntary Principles on security and human rights and transparency initiatives, others, such as labor standards, have an indirect effect. These initiatives also cover a range of approaches from voluntary self-regulation to more robust public regulation. Noting the multifaceted nature of these efforts, participants sought to identify both promising initiatives and the potential for greater complementarity between them.

While many participants noted that the most promising initiatives were those that had an element of enforceability backed by market and legal sanction for non-compliance (i.e. those in the third column from the left), some participants noted that there is a case to be made for the value of company self-regulation in the absence of rule of law, either in the host or home countries. This schema is not meant to suggest that hard law is everywhere the preferable mode of regulation. In many cases even good laws are not enforceable. In many others, even enforceable laws can only sanction that which is illegal, and cannot reach those legal activities that are yet undesirable because of their negative impact on conflict dynamics. Here, continued development of company voluntary self-regulation is both necessary and desirable.

Promising Initiatives:

What Works and Why?

In reviewing the spectrum of initiatives and standards that have a bearing on the promotion of conflict-sensitive business practices, workshop participants sought to identify the most promising initiatives. Many participants concluded that the most promising initiatives were those that displayed the following features:

1. **Specificity:** They responded to a clearly defined problem or challenge.
e.g. Blood Diamonds, Terrorist Financing, Abuse of Natural Resource Revenues.
2. **Urgency/Crisis:** The specific problem was accompanied by a broad consensus that it posed a dire threat to human rights and/or international peace and security, such as the use of revenues from blood diamonds to finance a brutal campaign by the RUF in Sierra Leone against civilians or the non-transparent use of Oil Revenues to finance repressive and violent policies in Sudan and Angola.
3. **Self-interest:** Key stakeholders, including companies, NGOs, civil society groups, governments and the UN all had a compelling interest in rectifying the problem. For companies, maintaining secure operations, reputational standing, financial standing and comparative advantage versus rivals, and reducing liability were compelling concerns.
4. **External Push:** A combination of NGO advocacy, media attention, and early and consistent engagement by governments helped to push companies towards improved practices. In some cases, such as conflict diamonds and the Kimberley Process, the support of UN Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions provided authority and global legitimacy.
5. **Multistakeholder Process:** Policy solutions were designed collectively among companies, governments, NGOs and others. This allowed for consensus-building and maximal buy in from companies.
6. **Enforceability:** The resulting policy frameworks contained an element of enforceability backed by market and legal sanction for non-compliance (i.e. those in the third column from the left in the above table)

Case Study: The Kimberley Process

Among the workshop participants, there was wide agreement that one of the most successful initiatives to date to address the role of business in conflict zones has been the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds. The process displayed virtually all of the critical features outlined in the previous section. While it began as a voluntary multistakeholder dialogue, through a series of consultations and studies, the resulting Scheme took on a more robust regulatory character by including performance obligations backed by domestic legal sanction, by developing eligibility requirements, and by extending the framework to all diamond producing, trading and importing countries. The result is that unless diamond companies comply with the certification requirements, they cannot legally participate in the international diamond trade.

Several other recent initiatives, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, feature some of the needed characteristics (for example, they are multistakeholder processes between governments, companies, and NGOs; they target specific problems, and enjoy some external push). However, participants underlined the fact that these initiatives have not yet determined eligibility requirements or performance obligations, and are still lacking firm public policy backing.

Meeting Outcomes:

I. Policy Recommendations:

The members of the workshop proposed a number of recommendations that the GC Office could use as a starting point for the development of a policy paper directed toward governments, the United Nations and international lenders. The goal of the policy paper is to develop public policy responses that would promote and reward actual improvements in company performance in implementing conflict-sensitive business practices, extend them to other sectors and business actors (juniors, state-owned enterprises, supply-chain companies), and contribute to a more robust and coordinated global policy. Participants also recommended that the GC Office should explore the possibility of an inter-governmental best practices policy conference.

1. For Governments

- Improved conflict-sensitive business practices will require greater public policy engagement and sustained inter-governmental support.
- Possible intergovernmental fora and initiatives for promoting inter-governmental work in this area include: the G8, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the OECD, NEPAD, the Human Security Network, the UN Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and support for the relevant provisions of the new *German Action Plan for Crisis Management*. Use of G8 in particular could provide the much needed, high-level intergovernmental support for public policies that deepen and extend conflict sensitive business practices.
- All governments should conduct due diligence: pull together key officials and members of leading initiatives: Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Financial Action Task Force to identify gaps and opportunities.
- All governments can explore the extension of multistakeholder processes, and perhaps, support an inter-governmental best practices policy conference.
- Home governments need to use their authority to engage their financial, trade and development agencies in working with companies, host governments to promote improved conflict-sensitive business practices:

- Coordinate overseas investment promotion activities of national trade ministries with foreign policy commitments to conflict prevention and resolution.
- Coordinate development assistance, private investment and post-conflict reconstruction strategies such that development aid and private investment are directed at sustainable recovery rather than dependency.
- Channel development assistance toward the support to DDDR programmes and projects aimed at rehabilitating local business.
- Home Governments can do more to promote socially responsible, conflict-sensitive investment:
 - Better promote ECA engagement in on-going efforts to promote conflict sensitive business practices and investment through the EITI and the forum established for ECAs within the OECD.
 - Review government policies for extending publicly financed risk insurance and export credits to companies based in their jurisdictions to ensure that lending practices assist and reward those who are adhering to high standards of human rights and conflict-sensitive business practices. Ensure that pre-operational and operational conflict impact assessments and transparency standards are a condition of lending to companies.
 - Explore the potential for using existing domestic regulatory agencies, such Securities and Exchange Commissions, to promote conflict-sensitive business practices. Consider tying eligibility of companies for listing on Stock Exchanges to compliance with accepted CSR codes.
- All governments should explore the potential of devising appropriate international and domestic norms to define mandates and obligations for private security firms, as these actors are indispensable to postconflict reconstruction efforts in many countries, but operate in legal limbo. Doing so, would help separate out acceptable from unacceptable behavior as well as clarify their obligations under international law. Such an effort would complement the efforts of the Voluntary Principles in promoting security and human rights, which, though applicable in principle to private and state security firms, has been cautious about participation by private security firms, fearing that they will use the VPs as a way to garner new business.

2. For International Lenders (including IFIs and government agencies)

- Review current lending practices to ensure that good performers are rewarded for adherence to transparency requirements, fiscal accountability, security sector reform, and other conflict-sensitive business practices.
- Integrate Policies to promote Conflict Sensitive Business practices into lending policies:
 - The IFC is currently upgrading its Social Safeguards but, at this point, these remain mute on the subject of conflict prevention. It should use the opportunity to include elementary provisions, such as conflict impact assessments, in its safeguard policies.
 - The IFC and the RDBs should be encouraged by the UN Secretariat and interested governments to explore and identify other incentives to ensure that private sector activities in fragile and war-torn settings contribute to peace building. They might explore the potential of using conflict impact assessment tools and transparency requirements as an additional means by which to assess and award investment projects.

- In addition to on-going efforts to ensure that loans made to project financing are conditional on high performance standards, encourage the inclusion of conflict-sensitive practices and policies into production sharing agreements (PSAs) between extractive companies and host governments, including transparency requirements and continual conflict impact assessments (rather than one-off exercise of due diligence).
- Complement emerging transparency initiatives for Natural Resource Revenues by developing comprehensive accounting systems that identify not only the revenues paid to governments but also how these revenues are spent.
- Reward projects that include revenue-sharing agreements that have transparent processes for decision-making and oversight.
- Facilitate partnerships with multilateral and bilateral development assistance agencies for coordinated investments.
- Promote post-conflict economic reconstruction policies that are sensitive to the particular needs of war-torn countries rather than impose cookie cutter macro-stabilization and privatization strategies.
- Support complementary credit facilities for local SMEs in post-conflict settings.

3. For UN agencies

- Promote a positive interface between UN agencies and private sector actors in war torn and post-conflict settings. Thus far there is little coordination among UN missions, field agencies and private sector actors. Very often relations are hostile. Companies identified a need for greater engagement with UN actors in field, open communication, sharing of information regarding local security situation to identify risks and threats, joint projects to build trust with local communities, to identify potential sources of tension and devise proactive and coordinated policy responses, to assist in identifying local suppliers and create sustainable local economic capacities, and otherwise to help companies better understand the context in which they are operating and how they can optimize their conflict-sensitive practices. Such cooperation could be led by UN Country Resident Coordinators or UN Peace Missions.
- Companies express continued concern about how to manage relations with armed groups, here UN DPKO could share lessons learned from extensive peacekeeping experience and thereby help companies to develop coherent policies.
- UN DPKO, OCHA, and UNDP BCPR which have experience and practical knowledge on Security Sector Reform should consider initiatives to support private sector actors with operations on the ground, including local SMEs, that seek to improve the use of accountable and rights-respecting security services to protect their operations and personnel.
- DDDR may be better targeted to training demobilized combatants in skills needed by proposed and ongoing private sector projects.
- Working with the Global Compact, survey the emerging initiatives that specific companies in conflict and post-conflict settings undertake in cooperation with UN country missions in order to draw out best practices.
- UN efforts to build national capacity could be strengthened by including private sector stakeholders in the UNDP/DPA program for national capacity building, perhaps drawing on the example of cooperation between Shell Oil and UNDP in Nigeria.
- UNSC may consider the integration into peacekeeping and reconstruction mandates a preference for contracting local business and suppliers to ensure they benefit from donor assistance and to promote sustainable recovery that does not depend on continued foreign presence.

- UNSC should give consideration to providing necessary staff and resources to UN Peace Missions in order to deal with actors and issues related to the political economy of conflict.

4. For NGOs

- Development NGOs can assist by creating training programs

II. Proposed Practical Initiatives

Among the workshop participants, a variety of outstanding issues were identified as in need of further deliberation and policy analysis, including: the determination of which norms or standards are best suited to promoting conflict-sensitive business practices; how to ensure the complementarity of self-regulation and public policy regulation; the need for further firm level guidance on a number of critical and complex questions including how to conduct their operations where host country law and governance is absent; how to identify legitimate community interlocutors; how to deal with armed groups; how to manage extended supply chains; how to ensure security while protecting civilians; and how to determine the criteria by which to assess those settings where conflict and absence of rule of law are so severe that investment and operations cannot be assured to “do no harm”, let alone to promote peacebuilding.

There was also continued debate as to what should be the appropriate roles and responsibilities of companies, home and host governments, international financial actors, and UN actors in ensuring the effective implementation of conflict-sensitive business practices.

This said, there was wide agreement among participants that much more needs to be done to effect practical and positive change on the ground. Having “talked the talk”, the participants explored ways by which to “walk the walk.”

Several practical projects were discussed, each of which involved extending and modifying the Global Compact’s use of multistakeholder dialogue, learning and partnering to work with companies, local business, home and host governments, UN agencies, international financial and developing agencies and civil society on the ground in conflict-prone, war-torn, or post-conflict societies where all stakeholders have an interest in promoting sustainable peace and development. All agreed that both local ownership and inter-governmental support were critical priorities.

In this, the participants sought to modify the GC’s use of regional dialogues -- until now, used primarily as a vehicle for engaging regional stakeholders and sensitizing them to the need for collective efforts to promote conflict-sensitive business practices -- so as to focus its energies and resources on a clear practical problem-oriented policy challenge in a given context, and to include critical actors.

a) Proposed Nigeria Initiative:

Some participants proposed that the GC explore the possibility of creating a Multistakeholder Initiative to assist on-going efforts by the Government of Nigeria, the EITI, the IFIs, companies, their home governments, and UN agencies such as UNDP to promote transparency and to manage resource-related conflicts in affected communities.

Participants recognized the increasing risks of resource related armed conflicts in the Niger Delta, and the threats they pose to political stability, civilian security, and sustainable development. Companies fear that the situation may degenerate to a point where they may have to consider ceasing operations, a decision that would have adverse consequences for Nigeria’s economic development.

Participants also viewed the leadership and commitment of President Obasanjo to improved transparency and initiatives like the EITI as a potential opportunity for other interested stakeholders to assist Nigeria in developing appropriate capacity by working with the UN, the Nigerian Government and companies to:

- Promote security sector reform;
- Promote human rights;
- Develop equitable and transparent systems of revenue management;
- Promote alternative livelihoods for affected communities including through concerted efforts at local business development and to promote improved communications and dispute-resolution mechanisms with communities in the Niger Delta.

While such an initiative could assist in identifying appropriate and practical synergies between different stakeholders in Nigeria, some participants expressed reservations as to whether the GC has the rights set of expertise and resources available and whether adequate ground work has been done. They cautioned the GC to undertake extensive due diligence with the Government of Nigeria, the EITI and others to assess whether and how the GC multistakeholder model can provide value-added to these parallel efforts.

b) Proposed West Africa Dialogue

A related but distinct proposal was for the GC, through its policy dialogue, to assist the recovery of countries of West Africa, which are seeking to emerge from set of inter-linked regional conflicts, many of which were triggered and fed by violent predation of natural resource wealth. Restoring good governance to natural resource management, promoting alternative civilian economic opportunities, and promoting regional economic cooperation were identified as essential to ensuring sustainable peace in the region.

The proposal involved linking up the Global Compact with local governments, UN agencies on the ground, IFIs, local business and NGO, and Transnational companies with ongoing or prospective investment in the region in a multistakeholder process that would allow them to build trust, exchange best practices, build local capacity, and identify openings for public-private partnerships in support of peace and economic development. Here the aim would be to develop more coherent and systematic coordination of private investment, and overseas development aid, and to determine how public-private partnerships can better contribute to post-war reconstruction.

It was suggested that the good offices of the UN SRSG for West Africa may be an appropriate focal point for convening this process. As reflected in his recent report on the Regional Dimensions of Conflict Prevention in West Africa, economic issues are high on the agenda. Moreover, the SRSG for West Africa has already indicated a desire to convene a high level meeting between private companies and government donors to devise more effective policies for sustainable economic recovery

Again, participants expressed a concern that more diligence is needed to ensure a reliable needs assessment of the countries in question, to conduct a rigorous feasibility study, and to establish a clear sense of what the desired outcomes are and whether the GC is best suited to undertake this work.

Given the tentativeness of each proposal, the participants agreed to establish a small working group to take the lead in further fleshing out these proposals. They are to report back to the next workshop with further findings.¹

¹ The members of this working group are: Jessie Banfield (International Alert); Shawna Christianson (International Affairs Canada); Bennett Freeman (Burston-Marsteller); Modem Lawson (UN DPA); Youssef Mahmoud (UN DPA); Errol Mendes (University of Ottawa); Jonas Moberg (International Business Leaders Forum); Helen Sullivan (Shell Limited International), Salil Tripathi (Amnesty International); Luc Zandvliet (Corporate Engagement Project), World Bank Representative (to be identified through Ian Bannon).



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